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I.

Na tare 0ftIIe

A.

This

is

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Case

an employment case arising out

0f Simplot’s recruiting

and hiring

0f

Erik Knudsen in November of 2015, followed by his termination effective September
1,

As

2016.

more

set forth in

Packaging Engineer and

working at HP,

detail below, Simplot advertised t0 hire a Senior

solicited

Inc. as a Senior

an application from Knudsen, who

at the time

was

Packaging Engineer. Knudsen applied and was

interviewed by Simplot. After his interview, Knudsen was offered the position 0f

Packaging Engineer

4.

He

accepted the position With Simplot and resigned from HP.

On Knudsen’s first day 0f work at

Simplot, he

his time as a Packaging Engineer

Manager.

When

Manager

position,

told that

he would only spend half

and would spend the other half as a Startup

Mr. Knudsen was unable t0 successfully perform in the Startup

he asked

time Packaging Engineer.

Human

was

t0

be allowed t0

When

fulfill

his requests

the job he had applied for — a

full-

were denied, he sought help from

Resources (“HR”) and ﬁled an internal complaint pursuant t0 Simplot’s

written policy. In raising his concerns,
the job that he

was hired

an internal investigation
by: 1) placing

Knudsen made

to perform. After

clear that he

Knudsen involved

0f his complaint, Simplot

began

him 0n a performance improvement plan

APPELLANT KNUDEN’S OPENING BRIEF

-

1

was misled about

HR and participated in

its retaliation

(“PIP”); 2)

against

him

harassing him;

3)

placing

him on involuntary administrative

leave;

and

4) ultimately,

by terminating

his employment.

As

a

result,

Knudsen

a

filed

Complaint

alleging:

Fraudulent

Misrepresentation, Promissory Estoppel, Breach of Covenant 0f Good Faith and Fair
Dealing, and Negligent Inﬂiction of Emotional Distress. See Clerk’s Record

(“R.”)1,

pp. 9-20.

At the conclusion
R., pp. 42-198.

of discovery, Simplot filed a

The motion was

fully briefed (R., pp. 42-198, 202-442),

Judge took oral argument 0n September
Decision Re! Motion for
Simplot’s motion

Motion for Summary Judgment.

5,

District

2018. Tr. 09.05.18. The court issued

Summary Judgment 0n November

and entering Judgment in

and the

its favor,

13,

its

2018, granting

dismissing Knudsen’s claims.

R., pp. 443-63, 667-68.

Knudsen filed a Motion
District Court in
L.

13.

an

t0

Reconsider (R, pp. 669-88), Which was denied by the

oral ruling 0n

March

In the interim, Simplot filed a

Attorneys’Fees.

R., pp.

13, 2019. Tr.03.13.19 at p. 19, L. 8- p. 20,

Memorandum and Afﬁdavit

01"

Costs

and

464-544. The District Court awarded costs as a matter 0f

Citations t0 the Clerk’s Record (“R”) Will be followed by the page numbersl e.g., “R., p. _.” and Will
be followed by the deposition page and line numbers Where appropriatel e.g., “R., p. _ at page(s)Iline(s).”
Citations to the Transcripts (“T12”) will be followed by the date 0f the corresponding Transcript and
the page and line numbers Where appropriatel e.g., “TL, p. _, L. _.”
1
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2

right,

but denied discretionary costs and attorneys’ fees t0 Simplot, Tr. 03.13.19,

20, L. 12

-

p. 21, L. 4,

Knudsen

and entered an Amended Judgment.

filed his

Notice oprpeaI.

p.

R., p. 718-19.

R., p. 720-26.

Simplot

a Notice 0f

filed

Cross-Appeal (R, pp. 727-731) related to the District Court’s denial of Simplot’s
attorneys’ fees.

Sta tement 0ft11e Case

B.

As

of the Fall of 2015, Simplot

in the Treasure Valley

— Tim Lalley and Jason Schwark.

employees designed packaging
with the packaging
lines. R., p.

for food products (e.g.,

for shipping

and delivery

303 at 19739-198316.

Simplot, burdening Lalley and
R., p.

had two Senior Packaging Engineers working

A

of

R., p.

bags for french

bagged food coming

third Packaging Engineer

Schwark With the work

0f three

off

along

production

had recently

left

Packaging Engineers.

Id.

At this same time, Knudsen had been working at HP,
of those years as a

for electronic devices

He

fries),

310 at 3434-25. Because of the workload, Simplot decided t0 hire another

Packaging Engineer.

’7

310 at 34319-25. These

enjoyed his job at

Packaging Engineer. In that
(8g, printers).

R., pp.

role,

Inc. in Boise for 13 years,

Knudsen designed packaging

271-74 at 7322-933; 12118-1437; 2039-2121.

HP and received positive feedback from his supervisor including

the following from his 2015 Performance Review:

APPELLANT KNUDEN’S OPENING BRIEF

-

3

[Knudsen] has a ‘get’er done’ approach that enables him to press
I often hear him contributing t0 project
through a large workload
team meetings. He has a way of drawing team members into a common
Erik is engaged
solution path and keeping everyone calm
He
has a great attitude, is knowledgeable, and willing t0 participate.
.

.

.

.

.

427-28; see also R.,

R., pp.

R., p.

p.

.

.

.

.

273-74 at 13113-25; 2036-8;

R., p.

.

.

.

279-80 at 44323-45322;

302 at 195318-19637.
In

Summer and

Engineer position.

announcement

to

R.,

Fall 0f 2015, Simplot advertised for a Senior Packaging

p.

Knudsen.

through the hiring process.

280 at 45123-4834.

280 at 46120-4731. As part 0f that process,

him the Senior Packaging Engineer

summary

Simplot recruiter sent the job

346 at 9319-1014. Knudsen applied and went

1d,; R., p.

R., p.

A

job description. R., p.

HR

sent

280 at 4738-18. The

0f the position statedi

This position

is

responsible for

The

J. R1

Simplot Feod Group packaging development efforts to

include packaging design and speciﬁcation, testingpackaging materials! establishing written

packaging specifications, and project management related

and

capabilities.

Supports foodservice customers and

emphasis on

t0

retaii

packaging equipment operation

customers

in

packaging design,

with

packaging design that delivers the presentation and consumer
attributes
as
designated
apnea!
by the client.
particuiar

retaiI

132-133.

R., pp.

Simplot’s hiring/interviewing

team included the following personnel, among

others:
o

Lyle Schook, Senior Director of Engineering;

o

Craig Lamberton, Director of Packaging Engineering;

o

Kent Anderson, Director

0f Technical Engineering;

APPELLANT KNUDEN’S OPENING BRIEF

-

4

R.

p.,

HR Manager;

o

Laura Nessen,

o

Jason Schwark and Tim Lalley, Senior Packaging Engineers.

282 at 5536-22;

R., p. 394-96.

During the interview process, Which included

multiple panel interviews, Simplot told
for

new products working With the

and,

Knudsen he would be designing packaging

other two Senior Packaging Engineers, Lalley and

Schwark, and that the Packaging Engineers would
283-85 at

Engineering Director Lamberton.

R., pp.

Knudsen asked Lalley what type

0f “project

as this

was

5’71

all

report

t0

Packaging

15-21, 671 18-21. Before his hire,

management” Packaging Engineers

listed in the job description. Lalley explained that project

did,

management

meant ensuring that your packaging design worked With Simplot’s equipment and,

making any needed design adjustments.

it

did not,

p.

307 at 215119-21611. This “project management” was

a packaging engineer at

On October 30,

and gave
It is

302-03 at 196322-198316;

like the

HP regarding printer packaging.

2015, Simplot offered

23, 2015, reporting t0 Craig

offer

R., p.

Lamberton.

Knudsen the

R., pp. 355-56.

notice of his resignation to

HP.

R., pp.

if

R.,

work Knudsen did as

Id.

position effective

November

Knudsen accepted

Simplot’s

271-72 at 8321-933.

undisputed that n0 one told Knudsen that he would only be performing

Packaging Engineering duties part-time.

R., pp.

265-66 at 96123-97315;

R., p.

86114-24. Yet, Lalley testified that after the interview process, but before

started at Simplot,

Lamberton

told Lalley that the

APPELLANT KNUDEN’S OPENING BRIEF

288 at

Knudsen

Packaging Engineer position

-

5

for

Which Simplot had hired Knudsen was only part-time.

310 at 32320-33125. In

R., p.

truth, Simploti

knew

didn’t have a 100
was] going to lose Craig [Lamberton] and
—
percent workload for somebody to a new employee to come in and work
0n packaging materials and [it] had a need for the equipment side 0f
things. And that’s What the intent was all along for this person, to work
0n both the equipment and the materials.

R., p.

[it

.

265 at 95119-25. In other words, “Knudsen was hired

November/December

0f 2015,

it

was meant

materials and operation packaging.” R.,

and the case packers,”
manufacturing ﬂoor.
It is also

126.,

.

to

fill

be a dual role — both packaging

means the design

means “more

of the food packaging

of the equipment, the baggers

the machines used for packaging the food on the

Id.

undisputed that at n0 time during the hiring process did anyone at

Simplot say one word about Startup Management t0 Knudsen.
R., p.

283 at 5738-10;

25. Yet,

could

have

HR

fulfill

an open position in

134; R., p. 265 at 94120-96322 (emphasis

p.

added). According to Simplot, the materials
(“the film, corrugated”), While operations

t0

.

R., p.

304 at 20214-14;

R., p.

R., p.

342 at 6515-10;

R., p.

Manager Nessen admitted that Simplot was looking
the Startup

to “help

Manager

role,

256 at 8114-17;

for

344 at 122321-

someone Who

but that n0 one told Knudsen that he would

with packaging equipment on the operations side” in addition t0 the

design 0f packaging 0n the materials side. R.,

p.

340 at 5036-13;

25.

APPELLANT KNUDEN’S OPENING BRIEF
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6

R., p.

344 at 122321-

On November 23,

2015, his first day 0f employment, Simplot, for the first time,

informed Knudsen that he was not going
instead,

would spend 50%

0f his time as a

as a Startup Manager. R.,

p.

Knudsen had n0 idea What

know

t0

it

be a full-time Packaging Engineer but,

Packaging Engineer and 50% of his time

284 at 61323-6212;

meant

t0

R., p.

286 at 70318-23,

be a “Startup Manager”

that Simplot had begun plans t0 upgrade

;

he certainly did not

equipment at

its

R., p. 425.

its

Grand Forks,

North Dakota plant — a significant undertaking, Which became a $22 million dollar
project, requiring a

Startup Manager.

R., p.

284 at 62114-18;

R., pp.

350-51 at 5320-

24, 10123-25.

Then, 0n his fourth day 0f work, Simplot

ﬂew Knudsen 0n

Grand Forks With other employees, managers, and

Upon his

arrival,

Knudsen

directors. R., p.

286 at 69312-19.

Simplot introduced Knudsen as the Startup Manager for the Grand

Forks equipment upgrade.

November

the corporate jet t0

Id.

Knudsen received a Communications Plan, dated

30, 2015, related t0 the

“Grand Forks Packaging Upgrade

Project,” listing

as the “Startup Manager.” R., pp. 369-73.

A Simplot Inter-Office Communication from Lyle Schook, also dated November
30, 2015,

announced that Knudsen had accepted the Packaging Engineer

effective

November

changes.” R.,

p.

23rd,

position,

but that there would be “some minor organizational

357. This

memo

disclosed that Craig Lamberton, Director of

Packaging and Knudsen’s Simplot boss, was moving back

APPELLANT KNUDEN’S OPENING BRIEF
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7

t0 Australia,

a complete

surprise to Knudsen. R.,

p.

283 at 57122-58125;

R., p. 357.

The other two Packaging

Engineers, Lalley and Schwark, would then t0 report t0 Schook and would “continue
t0 focus

t0

0n the front end 0f the business.” Knudsen, 0n the other hand, would report

Kent Anderson, Director

and would

0f Technical Engineering,

“deliver support to

the technical need for Packaging Operations as well.” Id. According t0 Simplot, “[t]his
Will allow

us to cover the huge technical gap

departure.” Id. This

memo

hiring Knudsen, Simplot

someone

t0

is

knew

consistent With Anderson’s testimony that prior to
it

would be losing Lamberton and intended

work 0n the operations/equipment

percent workload” for a Packaging Engineer. R.,

as a full-time Packaging Engineer. R.,

p.

because

side,

it

“didn’t

it

288 at 86314-24;

R., pp.

have a 100

never intended to have him work
R., pp.

291-92 at 108323-

Knudsen ended up spending, 0n average, about half

working as the Startup Manager.

t0 hire

265 at 95319-25.

p.

Simplot told Knudsen more than once that

10933. Indeed,

through Craig [Lamberton]’s

left

0f his time

286-87 at 71122-73319. Knudsen tried to

succeed as the Startup Manager, despite his complete lack 0f experience/background
in the food industry, let alone in operations/equipment.

[S]tartup [M]anager

some kind

is

an actual

role that

would be expected

0f familiarity with the industry.” R., p.

education was in materials/packaging With a

MS.

As Knudsen put

BS.

in packaging science. R., p. 27 1 at 7124-812.

0f

284 at 61111-13. Knudsen’s

Knudsen

-

8

“[a]

someone who has

in textile material science

APPELLANT KNUDEN’S OPENING BRIEF

it,

and an

tried “doing everything” he

could but lacked even basic background in food processing. R.,
p.

p.

291 at 105116-21;

300 at 172319-20. Knudsen told his boss, Anderson, that “he did not

feel like

R.,

he was

adding any value, he was over his head, and he didn’t know What to d0” as Startup

Manager.

258-59 at 24322—2533.

R., pp.

Knudsen’s two Packaging Engineer colleagues, Lalley and Schwark, were
“definitely disturbed that [Knudsen]

had been taken away from that packaging

engineering role and put 0n the startup manager
testified,

he was disappointed “we didn’t have

needed.” R.,

role.” R., p.

all

287 at 7435-8. Lalley

the help that

we thought we

311 at 95119-21. Schwark said he was frustrated because he thought

p.

they were “getting another Senior Packaging Engineer for the team, but in

[Knudsen] was spending a
p.

lot 0f

time as a [S]tartup [M]anager in Grand Forks.”

354 at 45113-19. They told Knudsen,

Manager]

job.

This

is

Lalley confirmed that

he did not apply

On June

“I can’t

not part of your job scope. This

is

not part 0f our job scope.
it.” R., p.

I

299 at 16518-12.

Knudsen expressed concern that he was being asked t0 d0 a job

for. R., p.

7,

R.,

believe you’re doing this [Startup

this before. Can’t believe you’re doing

have never done

fact,

2016,

311 at 93315-18.

Knudsen arranged a meeting With Schook, Senior Director
Knudsen explained that

Engineering, his boss’s boss. During the meeting,

Packaging Engineering position was “going really well

.

.

.

I

was

-

9

his

able to contribute

and make a good impact” but that he did not have the background

APPELLANT KNUDEN’S OPENING BRIEF

0f

t0 contribute at

the appropriate level as Startup Manager. R., pp. 291-92 at 107324-1093. Schook

responded, “You

know What?

engineer from the day
0f candor

never intended to put you to be a full-time packaging

hired you.” R., pp. 291-92 at 108123-1093. Schook’s

I

was extremely upsetting

his family

HP

I

and with two sons

had Simplot

Engineer. R.,

p.

On June

told

him

it

t0

Knudsen, because, as the

t0 support,

he never would have

sole

moment

breadwinner

left his

for

secure role at

never intended to hire him as a full-time Packaging

292 at 10914-15.

Knudsen emailed Vice President

21, 2016,

0f

HR, Kayce McEwan,

asking for help. His email included the following:
-Simp|ot misrepresented a job opening, enticed

and I’m now

at risk of losing

Am

situation doesn't align.

off

my management?

I

I

myjob
wrong

me to

leave a career with a

company for which had 14 years of service,
l

completely. Simplot must have standards of business cond uct, and surely this
in

my thinking? How would go about making this situation
I

fear that going to you with this issue

will

better without ticking

be the beginning of the end for me, and

I

don’t want

that to happen.

-Are there any checks and balances to assure this type ofthing doesn't happen to others?

two completely separate jobs? Obviously every job has variations with lots of
have two completely separate jobs with no overlap. Management claims
that one will help the other, but that's a facade. They need a startup manager, and my impression is that they don‘t
have the money to hire someone.
-ls it

normal to ask a

new

hire to learn

different projects/tasks/etc. This

is

different,

I

Thanks for your time. Iwant to have a successful career here, and

R., pp. 390-91.

See

also, R., p.

am

running out of options. lhope you can help.

292 at 110315-111119;

R., p.

330 at 2128-17. Simplot

chose not to respond t0 Knudsen’s plea for help and his job situation worsened. R.,

292 at 110115-11215;

R., p.

330 at 22313-19;

R., p. 390.

A week after Knudsen’s email to McEwan,
“Engineer 5” position.

R., pp. 397-98.

p.

Simplot posted a job opening for an

This job description clearly focused on the
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operations/equipment side

(129.,

the other half 0f the job

performing), as opposed to the materials side
Specifically,

said

it

that

the

position

(129.,

department

t0

work

0r

manage

processes, instrumentation,

his Packaging Engineer position).

“supports

company/group by providing technical support

Knudsen had been

production

t0 plant operating

projects to develop

and raw materials.”

new

efforts

the

0f

and maintenance

0r existing equipment,

Id. It also explicitly disclosed

that

the job responsibilities included “providing technical oversight t0 construction

&

startup activities.” Id. Notably, the announcement also contained a “Disclaimer”,

absent from the posting Simplot used t0 recruit Knudsen, stating

These statements are intended t0 describe the general nature and level
0f work being performed by people assigned t0 this classification. They
are not intended to be construed as an exhaustive list of all
responsibilities, duties and skills required 0f personnel so classified.
Id.

On

July

assistance,

7,

2016, after receiving n0 response t0 his direct request t0

Knudsen

HR

for

called Simplot’s employee complaint hotline seeking help. R., p.

91 at 140122-25; R.,

p.

374.

A

Simplot investigator then interviewed Knudsen

regarding his complaint and told Knudsen that

it

would Violate Simplot’s

2

policy2 for

Simplot’s personnel policy represents t0 employees that Simplot is prohibited from taking any
adverse actions against an employee who files a complaint or participates in an investigation as a
result 0f a complaint. R., pp. 374, 414.
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the

company

374.

t0 retaliate against

him

for his complaint. R., p.

McEwan finally responded to Knudsen 0n July
On July

Monday

11, 2016, the

8,

306 at 21112-18;

2016. R.,

p.

R., p.

390.

following Knudsen’s hotline compliant, Simplot

gave Knudsen a performance improvement plan (“PIP”) related to his performance as
Startup Manager.

Knudsen explained he was put on a PIP “for a job I never

R., p. 392.

wanted, that [Schook] had just admitted that he

.

.

lied t0

.

The PIP was inaccurate and did not provide

11336-11.

me

about.” R., p. 293 at

specific direction

0n how he

should “improve” his performance. Knudsen’s boss also further escalated his hostility

toward Knudsen.

R., p.

292 at 111120-11215;

example, Anderson was “0n
the time.”

asked

me

Id.

be just normal.”

Knudsen

him anytime

Things "
Id.

I

295-96 at 14611515012. For

my butt about just stupid stuff or just chewing me out all

“Something different happened in those

t0 text

so unusual.

R., pp.

didn’t

I

last three

did anything outside

my

weeks

.

direct office.

.

.

[Anderson]

And

this

was

understand Why he was questioning things that used

t0

Simplot used the PIP and the harassment t0 retaliate against

for reporting to

HR and lodging a hotline complaint.

R., pp.

289-90 at 9614-

97312.

Less than one month

later,

0n August

5,

2016, Simplot placed

Knudsen 0n

immediate, involuntary administrative leave for him t0 consider two options, to
either: 1) sign a release 0f liability

and receive 10-weeks’ severance

work under the PIP as a Startup Manager.

R., p.

289 at 9516-15;
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R., p.

0r 2) return to

299 at 165313-

16739. Simplot also advised

Knudsen

t0 seek legal counsel,

Which he

did. R., p.

299 at

165322-1663.

The lawyers
issues,

Simplot and Knudsen attempted t0 amicably resolve these

for

and Knudsen

still

Packaging Engineer.

hoped that Simplot would return him

R.,

p.

Rowe

Price, the

Simplot had changed his employment status.
212311-213320; R., pp. 419-20. Ultimately,
’7,

212111-213120; R.,
It is

company retirement

R., p.

301 at 17337-11;

HP if he had known that he was
R., p.

responsibilities.” R., p.

on designing materials

1,

left his

306-07 at

2016. R., pp. 306-07 at

long-term, secure job at

R., pp. 390-91.

The Packaging Engineer and

were “completely separate,

distinct,

for

packaging up the

packaging engineering” area.

0n

job

different

308 at 217313-18. As stated above, Packaging Engineers focus
food,

working 0n the “front end of the

business,” dealing with customers on design packaging needs,

focuses

R., pp.

leaving to take a part-time Packaging Engineer job

306 at 20939-21018,

Startup Manager positions

Manager

provider, that

426.

undisputed that Knudsen would not have

With Simplot.

full-time

Knudsen received a memo from Simplot,

2016, terminating him, as of September

p.

work as a

299 at 166317-18, 167318-168322. Instead, Knudsen

surprisingly learned through T.

dated September

to

the

R., p.

328 at 90114-91325;

equipment

used

and in the “day-to-day

R., p. 357.

packaging

for

While, a Startup

the

food

0n

the

operations/equipment side 0f the business. Specifically, a Startup Manager
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is

involved in tasks related to the construction and installation of equipment 0n the

manufacturing ﬂoor

t0

ensure that equipment successfully moves into production.

R.,

pp. 319-20 at 21113-2433.

II.

A.

ISSUES PRESENTED

Did the District Court err in determining there was no genuine issue

of

material fact as t0 Knudsen’s fraud claim?
B.

Did the

District Court err in in determining there

0f material fact as t0

C.

was n0 genuine

issue

Knudsen’s promissory estoppel claim?

Did the District Court err in determining there was no genuine issue

of

material fact as t0 Knudsen’s breach of the implied in law covenant of

good faith and
D.

fair dealing claim?

Did the District Court err in determining there was no genuine issue

of

material fact as to Knudsen’s negligent inﬂiction 0f emotional distress
claim?
E.

Is

Knudsen

fees be

entitled t0 costs 0n appeal

remanded

0f attorneys’

t0 the District Court?

III.

A.

and should the issue

ARGUMENT

Standard ofReVieW

This Court reviews de nova both the grant 0f Simplot’s Motion for

Judgment and the

denial of Knudsen’s Motion for Reconsideration.
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Summary

Massey

V.

Conagra Food, Ina, 156 Idaho 476, 479-80, 328 P.3d 456, 459-60 (2014). This Court

must liberally construe the record and draw
in favor of

Knudsen under

(quoting Steel

As

v.

is

reasonable inferences and conclusions

I.R.C.P. 56(0), Massey, 156 Idaho at 479, 328 P.3d at 459

Spokesman-Revjem 138 Idaho 249, 251, 61 P.3d 606, 608

set forth below, the District

judgment

all

not appropriate

‘[i]f

(2002)).

Court failed t0 follow this standard. “Summary
the evidence

is

conﬂicting on material issues, or

reasonable minds could reach different conclusions.”’

Id.

(quoting Peterson

if

V. 1301221126,

131 Idaho 537, 540, 960 P.2d 1266, 1269 (1998)).
B.

Summary 0fthe Argument

Based 0n the

facts set forth above,

Knudsen argued 0n summary judgment that

Simplot intentionally misled him about the job
baited
after

him With a representation

0f a full-time

it

hired

him

for.

In short, Simplot

Packaging Engineering

job,

and then

he started working, switched it to a part-time position and required him

to fulfill

a separate role as Startup Manager.
Simplot, 0n the other hand, argued that the Startup

Manager

position

was

merely a temporary assignment given t0 Knudsen as either part 0f his Packaging
Engineer

job,

01"

as a

way

for it t0 train

Knudsen.
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Knudsen

contested these facts. See, R., pp. 202-2503 In the Decision, the District Court

mischaracterized Knudsen’s argument " that Simplot misled

and that Simplot’s “misrepresentation about the

description”

m
Thus,

left

him

it is

him about the

to leave a

good position with [HP]

.”
.

.

.

R., p.

“true job

job description

and

443 (emphasis added).

clear that the District Court simply adopted Simplot’s story that the

Startup Manager duties were only a subset of the Packaging Engineer position and
not a separate, stand-alone position thus, ignoring evidence favorable t0 Knudsen,

and

failing to

draw

all

inferences in his favor.

Every time the District Court discussed the

Manager position,
0f

Knudsen’s

it

facts

concluded that the Startup Manager was simply a “task,” 0r part

“role,” 0r

simply a job “function.”

R., pp. 455,

time, the court ignored Knudsen’s evidence that he
positions

— one

surrounding the Startup

in design materials,

and one

457-458, 460. At the

was

fulfilling

same

two separate

in manufacturing operations. This

mischaracterization 0f Knudsen’s claims and the evidence led the District Court to
incorrectly conclude that “[n]0 false
identified

by Mr. Knudsen”

statement 0r misrepresentation has been

R., p. 454.

3

In addition to the facts set forth above, as set forth in the summary judgment materials before the
Knudsen adamantly denied that he was ever told either that the Startup Manager
position was merely a temporary assignment or that it was training. R., p. 284 at 6131-6333; R., p. 293
District Court,

at 114322-11514.
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By engaging

in impermissible fact-finding on

summary judgment,

the District

Court ignited a chain reaction, justifying dismissal of the remainder of Knudsen’s
claims. In reviewing the record de nova, a reasonable jury could reject Simplot’s

version 0f the facts, instead believing Simplot intentionally misled

a Packaging Engineer position
position

part-time,

and,

When

instead,

in fact,

have

it

Knudsen t0 accept

intended t0 limit Knudsen t0 that

him

perform

a

job

relating

operations/equipment (not packaging materials) like the Startup Manager
assigned him immediately upon hire. This Court must reverse

and remand

this case for a jury t0

to

role,

summary judgment

weigh the evidence and make the necessary factual

determinations.

Knudsen asks this Court t0 reverse the grant 0f summary judgment t0 Simplot,
vacate the

Amended Judgment, and remand

t0 the District

Court for further

proceedings.

C.

The Distn'ct Court Correctly Held Ea udulent Hiﬂ'ng Exists but Eﬂed
Men En ding Facts and Dra Wing Conclusions 1'11 Simplotis' Fa var
Z.

Fra ud 1'12

[21'1"1'ng 1's

a Viable claim in Idaho.

Fraud, including fraudulent inducement and intentional misrepresentation,

has long been a recognized

tort claim in Idaho.

See IDJI

4.60;

Zublke

V.

Anderson

Buick, Ina, 94 Idaho 634, 635, 496 P.2d 95, 96 (1972); Thurston Enters, Inc.

Safeguard Busmess

Sys., Ina,

V.

164 Idaho 709, 720, 435 P.3d 489, 500 (2019). Despite

APPELLANT KNUDEN’S OPENING BRIEF

-

17

well-established

this

Knudsen’s

The

at-Will

precedent,

Simplot

employment status precluded any claim

District Court correctly held that

representations,

false

argued 0n summary judgment that
of hiring fraud. R., p. 450.

Where “an employment contract

is

induced by

a cause 0f action for fraud can exist even though the

The

based

its

reasoning 0n this Court’s precedent that basic contract principles apply t0

all

relationship

is

terminable at-Will

.

.

..”

R., p. 452.

contracts including at-Will employment. R.,

Gas

00.,

451

(citing

Metcalf V. Intermountajn

116 Idaho 622, 624, 788 P.2d 744, 746 (1989); Sorensen

118 Idaho 664, 669, 799 P.2d
recognized there

is

As further

district court,

70,

n0 reason

because employment
452.4

p.

District Court

is at-will,

set forth

Comm

Tek 1110.,

75 (1990)). Likewise, the District Court correctly

t0 exclude tort claims, like fraud in hiring, solely

noting that several jurisdictions have agreed. R.,

below in section

and the Ninth

V.

C(3), Idaho’s

Court 0f Appeals,

its

p.

federal

Circuit Court of Appeals have all held fraud claims

Viable in hiring situations under circumstances analogous to this case.

2.

T119 District

Court erroneously found disputed facts 1'12 Simplot’s

fa var.

As explained above, the
defense that the Startup

District Court found facts

by adopting Simplot’s

Manager position was merely a temporary assignment given

Stewart V. Jackson & Nash, 976 F.2d 86 (2nd Cir. 1992); Meade V.
164 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 1999); and, Truth-In-erjng Claims and the At-VVJ'I] Rule,
1997 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 105. R., pp. 452-53.

4

The

District Court cited tol

Cedarapjds,

1116.,
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t0

Knudsen

Knudsen.

as either part 0f his Packaging Engineer job, or as a

R., pp. 53, 55-56, 61.

way

for

it

to train

Crediting only Simplot’s version of the facts led the

District Court t0 incorrectly conclude that “[n]0 false statement 0r misrepresentation

has been identified by Mr. Knudsen”

R., p. 454.

In reviewing this issue de nova in the light most favorable t0 Appellant,
substantial evidence supports that a reasonable jury could conclude that Simplot
intentionally misrepresented the position to Knudsen, enticing

him

t0 give

up his

career With HP. This evidence includes:
o

Simplot indicated

it

was hiring a Packaging Engineer

three Packaging Engineers that

had

left

to replace

one of

Simplot, as the two remaining

engineers were having trouble keeping up With the workload.
o

Simplot advertised t0 hire a “Senior Packaging Engineer.”

o

Simplot recruited Mr. Knudsen, a Packaging Engineer at HP, for this
position

and sent him the job

description.

The

description focused 0n

packaging design and specification and testing packaging materials.
o

Not one

of Simplot’s

employees throughout the hiring process said

anything t0 indicate that Simplot did not intend t0 hire a full-time

Packaging Engineer or even mention Startup Management. Further, n0
one told Knudsen that he would have “dual roles” in both materials and
in the operation/equipment sides 0f the company.

APPELLANT KNUDEN’S OPENING BRIEF

-

19

o

Simplot offered him the position reporting t0 Craig Lamberton, Director
0f Packaging; the

same individual Who supervised the other two Packing

Engineers.
o

Knudsen

quit his Packaging Engineer job With

full-time

Packaging Engineer job With Simplot.

Based upon these

facts,

HP

in order to accept a

a reasonable jury could conclude that Simplot represented t0

Knudsen that he was being hired

as a full-time Packaging Engineer.

Court failed t0 appropriately consider these

The

District

facts.

Further the District Court ignored the following material facts regarding
Simplot’s true intent:
o

After Simplot interviewed Knudsen, but before he started, Simplot told
fellow Packaging Engineer Lalley that
in packaging part-time. Lalley

the help that
o

we thought we

Knudsen was only going

was disappointed that “we

work

have

for

was a “dual

including work on both packaging materials and operations.

said, “[W]e

all

needed.”

Anderson admitted that the position they were hiring
role”,

didn’t

t0

knew we were going

we knew

[Lamberton] and

t0 lose Craig

new employee

we

didn’t

in

and work on packaging materials and we had a need

have a 100 percent workload

equipment side 0f things. And

that’s

for

.

.

.

a

what the intent was
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all

He

t0

come

for the

along for

work 0n both the equipment and the materials.”

this person t0

R., p.

265

at 95319-25.
o

HR admitted that Simplot was “looking for someone Who could fulfill the
startup

manager

role,”

but that no one told Knudsen that they needed

“help with packaging equipment 0n the operations side” as well as the

design of packaging materials.

R., p.

340 at 5016-13;

R., p.

344 at 122121-

25.

o

On

Knudsen’s

50%

first

day 0f work, Simplot told him that he would spend

0f his time as a

Packaging Engineer and 50% 0f his time as a

Startup Manager.
o

Just a few days into his employment, Simplot

Grand Forks plant and introduced him
million equipment upgrade
o

At

this

that his

—a

ﬂew Knudsen

as Startup

time,

Knudsen found out by way

new

boss,

Lamberton, was moving back

told

for a

$22

significant project.

same

Knudsen was

Manager

t0 the

he would now report

t0

0f

an

interoffice

t0 Australia.

memo
Thus,

Anderson, Director 0f

Technical Engineering, While the other two Packaging Engineers
reported to Schook. Likewise, the

memo

Packaging Engineers would “continue

indicated that the other two

to focus

on the front end of the

business.” Knudsen, 0n the other hand, would not only
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work as a

Packaging Engineer but was

need
o

for

Packaging Operations as

well.” R., p. 357.

Director of Engineering Schook told

What?

I

Knudsen on June

7th,

“You know

never intended t0 put you t0 be a full-time packaging engineer

from the day
o

t0 also “deliver support t0 the technical

I

hired you.” R., pp. 291-92 at 107324-10933.

Simplot had a separate job posting/description that focused 0n the
operations/equipment position and explicitly disclosed the Startup

Based on these

facts,

job.

ignored by the District Court, a reasonable jury could conclude

that Simplot knowingly hired

Knudsen as only a part-time Packaging Engineer,

intending him to spend the rest 0f his time 0n the operations/equipment side as a

Startup Manager. Therefore, a jury could determine that Simplot fraudulently

misrepresented the position to Knudsen.
Casela W supports vaca ting summary judgment 1'11 81mp10t’s fa V01"

3.

0n K11 udsen ’S fra ud claim.

The Idaho

Court

of

Appeals

affirmed

misrepresentation in a hiring context in Verway

Idaho 315, 698 P.2d 377

(Ct.

a
V.

jury

verdict

App. 1985). In Verway, a group 0f former meat packing

Blincoe’s union employees

operations, the

fraudulent

Bljncoe Packing 00., Ina, 108

employees claimed that they were misled When hired by Blincoe.
at 378.

for

Id. at 316,

698 P.2d

were out 0n strike and, in order maintain

company needed more employees.
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Blincoe advertised t0 hire

neW

regular (not temporary) employees. During the hiring process, Blincoe told the
hires that they
at 379.

would not be terminated When the

The employees

testified that

absent such assurances.
Blincoe terminated the
favor, the

new

698 P.2d

they would not have accepted work With Blincoe

Less than a week

Id.

strike ended. Id. at 317,

hires. Id. In

later,

the labor dispute resolved and

reviewing a jury verdict in the employees’

Court 0f Appeals held that the jury could have concluded that “Blincoe

fraudulently misrepresented t0 respondents that they would have permanent
positions, thereby inducing

them only has

0f

them

t0 quit their jobs, intending all along to

federal court also

had occasion

MaXJ'muS, Ina, 2014

claim in Harvey

V.

WL

Idaho Dec.

to consider

WL 6474051

(D.

an Idaho fraud in hiring

Idaho Nov.

19, 2014);

15, 2016).5

The case involved Maximus’ hiring

for its Boise call center in

2013 and 2014, and then laying

7256797

use

strike breakers.” Id.

The Idaho

employees

some

(D.

2016

0f at-Will

off

those

employees in 2015. Plaintiffs brought claims 0n behalf 0f themselves and those
similarly situated alleging that

opportunities

When it knew

“Maximus marketed and

that they were limited in time.” Id, 2014

*1.

5

offered open

Non-published cases are attached as an addendum

t0 the Brief.
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ended career

WL 6474051 at

In 2014, Judge Winmill denied the employer’s motion t0 dismiss plaintiffs’

fraud and promissory estoppel claims finding that they had sufficiently alleged that

they “were misled from the beginning about the type 0f employment they were
entering into.”

1d,,

employment

does

2014

WL

not

6474051 at

shield

an

*3.

In doing

so,

the court held that “at—will

from

employer

claims

misrepresentations about the nature of the employment.”

Id.

(citing

Cedarapjds, Ina, 164 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 1999) (discussed below)).

When

plaintiffs’

maintained both

motion

for class certification

plaintiffs’

was before the

court,

from

Meade

Then

V.

in 2016,

Judge Winmill

fraud and promissory estoppel claims based on Maximus’

misrepresentations about the type of employment

7256797 at

arising

it

offered plaintiffs. 1d,,

2016

WL

*4.

Likewise, the Ninth Circuit found a similarly Viable fraud in hiring claim

under Oregon 1aw6 in Meade, 164 F.3d 1218. In reversing summary judgment

for the

employer, the Ninth Circuit held that “genuine fact issues existed as to Whether

employer made

false representations

and Whether

plaintiffs’ justifiably relied

on

those representations.” Id. at 1220. There, a group 0f plaintiffs, offered jobs With
defendants, either quit jobs or passed up other opportunities t0 accept the at-will
offers.

6

During the hiring process, defendants made statements about the company’s

The elements

for fraud

under Oregon law are nearly identical
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future growth, expansion, and stability. Id. at 1221. However, the defendants closed

the division those employees worked in and they lost their jobs. Plaintiffs alleged that
the

company knew

that there

was

closure decision

0f the likely closure

when it hired them. The Ninth

Circuit agreed

sufficient evidence for a trier of fact t0 conclude that defendants’

was

sufficiently certain at the time 0f plaintiffs’ hires. Id. at 1222.

Here, Knudsen was told that he was being hired for a full-time Packaging

Engineer position. However, after he quit his job at
Simplot disclosed that

it

only intended

him

to

HP

and started

at Simplot,

work as a Packaging Engineer

half-

time and work as a Startup Manager for the rest 0f his time. Packaging Engineer and
Startup Manager are entirely different positions — the engineering position focuses

0n material engineering

(128.,

designing packaging materials for food), While the

startup position focuses 0n manufacturing engineering

equipment in the plants that package the

that

it

it

was only hiring him

to do

developing and installing

Knudsen never would have

HP had he been

Packaging Engineer position With
that

food).

(119.,

left his

Simplot had told him the truth —

packaging engineering part-time. Simplot’s intent

never intended Knudsen t0 work as a full-time Packaging Engineer

is

supported by a wealth of evidence, including admissions by Simplot Directors, as

summarized above

in section C(Z).
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4.

Knudsen has presen ted sufﬁcient

ﬁaud claim
The elements

111's

1'11

fa V01".

0f fraud arei

A statement 0f fact; (2) its falsity;

(1)

knowledge of

facts for a fury t0 decide the

its falsity; (5)

(3) its

materiality; (4) the speaker’s

the speaker’s intent t0 induce reliance;

(6)

the hearer’s ignorance 0f the falsity 0f the statement; (7) reliance by the
(8) the hearer’s right t0 rely; and (9) consequent and proximate

hearer;
injury.

Thurston Enters, Ina, 164 Idaho at 500, 435 P.3d at 720 (citations omitted).
Moreover, fraud can arise from:

(1)

an affirmative misrepresentation; and/or

misrepresentation from breach 0f a duty t0 disclose.” Humpbrjes
728, 736, 366 P.3d 1088, 1096 (2016).

As

V.

(2)

a

Becker, 159 Idaho

set forth below, construing the facts in

Knudsen’s favor creates genuine issues 0f fact supporting each element 0f Knudsen’s
fraud claim based on both affirmative misrepresentation and misrepresentation by
silence:

a.

Sjmplot made a false statement offact

-

elements

(1)

and (2)

A

fury could ﬁnd Simplot afﬁfma Lively misrepresen ted
the job.

1'.

Throughout the recruiting process, Simplot represented to Knudsen that it was
hiring

a

full-time

Senior

representations during
that the
after

company was

its

Simplot

Engineer.

made

the

same

interviews 0f Knudsen. Simplot thereafter represented

offering

Knudsen accepted the

Packaging

Knudsen a Packaging Engineer

position

position.

However,

and started working, he learned that Simplot’s
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representations were not true and that he

A

Engineer part-time.

was only hired

jury could find that Simplot

t0

made

work as a Packaging

false representations t0

Knudsen.
1'1'.

A

fury could find Simplot misrepresen ted the fob
through its Silence.

Alternatively, a jury could find that Simplot misrepresented the position by

breaching

its

duty to disclose facts to Knudsen during the hiring process. Sorenson

Adams, 98 Idaho
a

prospective

708, 715, 571 P.2d 769, 776 (1977)(s11ence in circumstances

purchaser

might be led

“representation”), overruled 0n other

348, 355, 336 P.3d 281, 288 (2014).

defendant has a duty t0 speak.

t0

harmful conclusion

grounds by Cummings

V.

00.,

a

where

form 0f

Stephens, 157 Idaho

Fraud may be established by

G&MFarms V. Funk Irr.

is

V.

silence

Where the

119 Idaho 514, 520, 808

P.2d 851, 857 (1991).7
This Court has held that

duty t0 speak arises in situations Where the

“[a]

parties do not deal 0n equal terms or

where information

to

be conveyed

in possession of the other party.” Id. This Court has further

is

not already

expanded the duty when

necessary t0 “prevent a partial statement 0f the facts from being misleading,” 0r

7

G&MFaI'mS, 119 Idaho

S.Ct. 1108, 63 L.Ed.2d

at 520, 808 P.2d at 857 (citing Chiarella

348

(1987) (failure t0 disclose

V.

United States, 445 U.S. 222, 100

Cofﬁn, 113 Idaho 37, 740 P.2d 1022
t0 a misrepresentation); Bethlalzmy V. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55,

(1980)); see also,

may amount

Tuscb Enters.

when

v.

415 P.2d 698 (1966) (failure t0 disclose may amount t0 a misrepresentation); Jones V. Majestas, 108
Idaho 69, 696 P.2d 920 (Ct. App. 1985) (fraud may be established by silence where information t0 be
conveyed is not already in possession 0f other party).
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the undisclosed fact

is

so Vital that

voidable. Pnhtcraft Press, Inc.

V.

if

the mistake were mutual the contract would be

Sunnysjde Park

Ut1']s., 1110.,

153 Idaho 440, 452, 283

P.3d 757, 769 (2012).
In

its

Decision, the District Court noted that the issue 0f whether the facts

asserted give rise t0 a duty t0 disclose

is “solely

a question 0f law.”

R., p. 455.

District Court ignored its obligation to “decide in the first instance

circumstances asserted,

if

Whether the

proved, would be sufficient t0 give rise t0 a duty t0

disclose.” Pn'ntcraf’t Press, Ina,

153 Idaho at 452, 283 P.3d at 769.

If

the plaintiff can

“generate a genuine issue 0f material fact as to those circumstances,” then
the jury to decide whether those facts are proven, and thus Whether there
t0 disclose.” Id.

0n the

facts,

The

But the

District Court here concluded there

was no duty t0

“it falls

to

was a duty

disclose

based

but in arriving at that conclusion, the court erred by not regarding

all

the facts and inferences in Knudsen’s favor. Once again, the District Court construed
the evidence in Simplot’s favor — that the Startup

Manager

job

was merely a

“task”

or a “function” of his Packaging Engineer job. R., p. 458.

The

District Court ignored that

offered a Packaging Engineer job,

its

intent to have

Knudsen had n0 way

0f

for,

When Simplot “knew we

workload” for a Packaging Engineer.

about

Knudsen applied

R., p.

interviewed
didn’t

for,

and was

have a 100 percent

265 at 95319-25. Simplot stayed

Knudsen work 0n the operations

side as a Startup

knowing Simplot’s true intent and was surprised
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silent

Manager.

to discover

0n his

first

day of work that he had competing, differing jobs

to fulfill.

These

facts,

taken as true, could support a jury conclusion that Simplot had a duty to disclose the
part-time nature of Knudsen’s Packaging Engineer job and/or that
also

work as a Startup Manager
b.

it

intended him t0

in operations.

Sjmplot’s false represen ta tjon was material — element (3)

“Materiality refers to the importance 0f the misrepresentation in determining

the plaintiff’s course 0f action.” Watts
(1998). Here,

With

HP

t0

it is

V.

Krebs, 131 Idaho 616, 619, 962 P.2d 387, 390

undisputed that Knudsen would not have quit his secure position

accept a part-time Packaging Engineer position. Thus,

misrepresentations were material. See Harvey,
c.

Two

Simplot’s

WL 6474051 2014 at *3.

Simplot knew its represen ta tions were false; K11 udsen did
not — elements (4) and (6')

Simplot Directors and an

HR Manager,

all 0f

Whom

hiring of Knudsen, indicated that they never intended t0 have

were involved in the

Knudsen

t0

perform

the singular, full-time role of a Packaging Engineer. Simplot said absolutely nothing
t0

Knudsen about a dual

position.

role in operations/equipment or

“Nothing in [Simplot’s]

offer letter

would

about the Startup Manager

alert [Knudsen] [he] [was] being

offered anything other than a” full-time Packaging Engineer position. Harvey, 2014

WL 6474051

at *4.
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d.

Sjmplot

bad

1'12

a right t0 d0

elements

As

it

tended Knudsen

and 121's
and (.9)

so,

(5), (7), (8),

advertised and offered

t0 act

0n

its

representa tz'ons,

reliance resulted

Knudsen a Packaging Engineer

1'12

129

injury

—

position, Simplot

intended for him t0 rely 0n those representations. Knudsen’s “acceptance 0f

employment
2014

WL

is

evidence that

6474051 at

[he] relied

0n the representations 0f [Simplot].” Harvey,

Knudsen had a

*4.

right t0 rely on the information Simplot

provided in writing and orally throughout the recruiting and hiring process, including
the offer letter.

Id. (“Plaintiffs right t0 rely is clearly laid

interviews and subsequent offer
at-will does not

means

change

plaintiffs

this.

had “no

because “[n]o at-Will job

As

letter.”)

The

fact that

Knudsen’s employment was

articulated by Judge Winmill, clear at-will language

right t0 rely 0n a contract for

is

out in the circumstances 0f

guaranteed, but there

is

an extended period

0f time”

a significant difference between”

a full-time and a part-time Packaging Engineer position.

Id.

Further, Knudsen’s

resignation from his stable career With

HP was

a direct result 0f Simplot’s

him a

full-time

Packaging Engineer position.

representation that

Harvey, 2014
D.

The

it

was

WL 6474051

offering

at *5.

lee Distn'ct Court Erroneously Gran ted Summary Judgment 011
Knudsen ’s Estoppel Claim
District Court held there

estoppel.” R.,

p.

460.

was “n0

Viable cause 0f action for promissory

In reaching this legal conclusion, the court once again
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determined facts in Simplot’s favor, deciding that Simplot made n0

specific

promise

that Knudsen’s Packaging Engineer position “would never include assisting in the
startup 0f packaging operation.” R.,
feasible

p.

461.

As explained above, an

alternatively

View of the facts could support a jury determination that Simplot promised

Knudsen a job as a

full-time

Packaging Engineer, but only provided a part-time one,

and instead expected Knudsen

t0

work the

rest of his time as a Startup

Manager, a

separate and distinct job. If the jury draws these conclusions, Which are reasonable

given the evidence, then he can support an estoppel claim Which requires he prove:
(1)

One

detriment;
(3)

on a promise created a substantial economic
the reliance was or should have been foreseeable; and

party’s reliance
(2)

the reliance was reasonable and justified.

Proﬁts Plus Capital Mgmt.,
(2014) (citation

Podesta, 156 Idaho 878, 891, 332 P.3d 785, 803

and quotation marks omitted). Here,

in Section C(4)(d), above,

him

LLC V.

Knudsen

relied

like the fraud analysis discussed

on Simplot’s promises that

as a full-time Packaging Engineer. That reliance led

term, secure job With

HP

as a Packaging Engineer.

would induce Knudsen’s reliance through

its

It

him

t0 resign

it

was hiring

from his long-

was foreseeable that Simplot

job posting, job

description,

information shared during the interview process, and, importantly, the offer
all of

which led Knudsen

to reasonably believe

the

letter,

he was being hired as a full-time

Packaging Engineer. Thus, his reliance was both reasonable and justified.
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Court should reverse summary judgment and remand Knudsen’s

This

promissory estoppel claim for

trial.

lee Distn'ct Court Erroneously Gran ted Summary Judgment 011
Knudsen Good Faith and Fair Dealing Claim

E.

15'

The

District Court once again

consider his evidence

misapprehended Knudsen’s claim and

When it determined that “[t]here is nothing in this record Which

would support an action

for the

breach 0f the implied covenant of good faith and

dealing because one of the duties that an Engineer 4 was asked t0 d0
startup

manager on a

the Startup

failed t0

project.” R., p. 460.

was

fair

t0 act as a

The court ignored Knudsen’s evidence that

Manager position was not simply part 0f his Packaging Engineer position

but a separate position making up the other 50% 0f his

job.

Moreover, the District

Court failed to acknowledge Knudsen’s argument that Simplot’s anti-retaliation
policy in conjunction With its representative’s statements that Simplot
retaliate against

him could support a breach

0f good faith

pp. 222-24. Instead, the court only addressed

Startup Manager position.

R., pp. 459-60.

and

would not

fair dealing claim. R.,

Knudsen’s argument related

t0 the

Based 0n the analysis below and Viewing

the facts in a light most favorable to Knudsen, the District Court erred in granting

summary judgment

t0

Simplot 0n this claim.
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This Court

first

recognized an implied-in-law covenant 0f good faith and fair

dealing in the employment context in the Metcalfcase. 116 Idaho at 626, 778 P.2d at

748 (1989). In doing

so, this

Court heldi

[T]he covenant protects the parties’ benefits in their

employment

and that any action Which violates, nullifies 0r
any benefit 0r right Which either party has in the
employment contract, Whether express or implied, it is a Violation 0f the
covenant Which we adopt today
contract or relationship,
significantly impairs

Id. at 627, 7’78

P.2d at 749.

Further, relying on principals established in earlier decisions, this Court
reiterated that limitations 0n terminationi

may

from

circumstances surrounding the
employment relationship, a reasonable person could conclude that both
parties intended that the employer's (or the employee's) right t0
terminate the employment relationship-at-Will had been limited by the
implied-in-fact agreement of the parties.
Id. at 624,

be implied

if,

all

778 P.2d at 746. Further,

“[t]his

handbook can constitute an element
(quoting Harkness

v.

will employee,

leave. Id.

Court has recognized that

‘[a]n

employee's

of the contract.” Id. at 625, 7’78 P.2d at 747

City ofBurIey, 110 Idaho 353, 356, 715 P.2d 1283, 1286 (1986)).

In Metcalzf Intermountain’
at a rate of one

the

day per month.

became

ill

s policy

provided employees could accrue sick leave

Id. at 623,

and had

t0

778 P.2d at 745. Metcalf, a long-time

at-

use a substantial portion 0f her accrued sick

Intermountain reduced her t0 part-time, allegedly in retaliation

taken her sick leave. This Court reversed summary judgment
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for

for

having

Intermountain on

Metcalf’s good faith

and

fair dealing claim. Id. Here,

Knudsen

called the hotline

and

lodged a complaint about Simplot’s misrepresentation that he was being hired as a
full-time

Packaging Engineer. Simplot’s Complaint Process Manager told Knudsen,

do want you t0 know it is a Violation of Company policy t0 retaliate
against any employee by taking an adverse employment action against
a person for filing a complaint With Simplot’s Employee Complaint
Department 0r participating in the investigative process as a Witness.
I

R., p. 374.

In short succession after this complaint, Knudsen was put on a PIP,

harassed by his boss, forced out on administrative leave, and eventually told he’d

been retroactively terminated,

effective

September

lst.

Based 0n the timing, Knudsen

reasonably believed Simplot’s adverse action was in retaliation for his complaint.

Given these

facts,

Knudsen should be afforded the opportunity

0f covenant claim to a jury

if

there

Who can,

t0 present his

breach

consistent With the holding in Metcalf,’ determine

was an implied contract prohibiting

retaliation for filing a complaint,

and

Whether Knudsen was retaliated against in Violation 0f the covenant 0f good faith and
fair dealing.

Alternative t0 the breach of good faith claim based upon Simplot’s antiretaliation policy,

Knudsen

also asserted that the covenant

was breached When

Simplot offered him a full-time Packaging Engineer position, and then 0n his

day and throughout the rest 0f his employment, only allowed him
Packaging Engineer 0n a part-time basis.

R., pp.
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t0

By doing

first

work as a
so,

Simplot

impaired Knudsen’s right to benefit from the contract by simply succeeding as a

Packaging Engineer at Simplot. Both parties agree that Knudsen’s performance was
deficient only in the Startup
total lack of education

Manager

role.

Knudsen maintains

and background necessary

by denying Knudsen the right

to

work as a

was a breach

A

was because

0f his

perform in that position. Thus,

full-time

materially impacted his success as an employee.
this too

t0

it

Packaging Engineer, Simplot

reasonable jury could find that

0f the covenant.

Court Erred 1'11 Dismissjng Emdsen ’s Negligent Inﬂjction
ofEmotjonaI Distress Claim
T116 District

F.

Negligent inﬂiction requires a showing 0f a breach of a legally recognized duty.

Wright

V.

Ada

Cty.,

grounds by Eller

V.

160 Idaho 491, 501, 376 P.3d 58, 68 (2016), overruled 0n other

Idaho State

Police,

165 Idaho 147, 443 P.3d 161 (2019). Because

the District Court incorrectly concluded that

Knudsen could not prove any 0f his other

claims, the court concluded that he failed t0 establish Simplot breached a legal duty
t0

him and,

thus, dismissed his negligence claim. R., pp. 461-62.

Once again, the

District Court ignored

Knudsen’s evidence in favor of Simplot’s

mantra that the Startup Manager was simply a
position. Thus, the court

employer

t0 list

was

job duty 0f the Packaging Engineer

able t0 conclude that there

every possible lawful task that

it

is

“n0 legal duty for an

might ask an employee

t0

perform

in a job interview 0r in a position description.” R., p. 462. Appellant does not disagree
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With this statement as a legal principal. However,
his fraud claim, then he Will

Hathaway V.

t0 Violate

Knudsen is

successful in proving

have successfully proven that Simplot breached a

duty not t0 commit fraud 0n him. This

have a duty not

if

is

legal

akin to this Court’s holdings that employers

law in dealings with their employees. For example, in

Bd. OfRegentS 0f Univ. ofldallo, this Court held that the Idaho

Human

Rights Act “does create certain duties for employers, the Violation 0f Which could form
the basis 0f a negligent inﬂiction of emotional distress claim.” 155 Idaho 255, 270, 310

P.3d 315, 330 (2013). Additionally, in Wright, this Court held that the Whistleblower
act established a duty for the employer. 160 Idaho at 501, 3’76 P.3d at 68.

holding was later overruled by Elle];

it

was done

While this

so because this Court found that the

Whistleblower Act provided a direct remedy for emotional distress damages thereby
supplanting the negligence claim. 165 Idaho at 157, 443 P.3d at 171. However,
typically, a plaintiff

Walston

As
it

must

V.

cannot recover emotional distress damages for fraud in Idaho.8

MonumentaILjfe Ins.

such,

if

this Court reverses

also reverse

determine

if

00.,

129 Idaho 211, 218, 923 P.2d 456, 463 (1996).

summary judgment 0n Knudsen’s fraud

judgment 0n his emotional

distress claim

and

let

claim,

the jury

he can meet his burden 0f proof regarding the same.

8

Alternatively, as argued below, this Court could find a breach 0f the duty to “exercise ordinary care
prevent foreseeable risks 0f harm t0 others.” Nation V. Idaho Dep’t 0f Correction, 144 Idaho 177,
191-92, 158 P.3d 953, 967-68 (2007); see R., pp. 225-26.
jury could ﬁnd it foreseeable that if Knudsen

t0

A

accepted a job that he did not seek and was not qualified

for,
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G.

Knudsen 1's Entitled t0 Costs 0n Appeal and Fees Should Be Left to tlze
District Court When J't Determines tlze Prevailing Party aﬁel- Remand

Should this Court vacate the

remand

this case

his appeal.

As a

Amended Judgment

in Simplot’s favor

0n any 0f Knudsen’s claims, then Knudsen
result,

pursuant

to

Will

and

have prevailed 0n

Idaho Appellate Rule 40, Knudsen would be

entitled to costs.

Additionally,

under

upon

if

I.C. §12-120(3).

he prevails at

trial after

remand, he

may

be entitled t0 fees

Thus, Knudsen requests this Court direct the District Court,

final resolution of the case, t0 consider

whether Knudsen

is

incurred 0n appeal

When

Rivers Packing

145 Idaho 408, 415, 179 P.3d 1064, 1071 (2008).

00.,

it

determines the prevailing party. See,

IV.

District Court’s grant 0f

summary judgment t0

for further proceedings,

and award

lst

Mackay

costs t0

Simplot,

this

Four

Court vacate the

remand to the

Knudsen.

dav of Mav, 2020
Byi/f/[I‘Iga 5/}‘05

Erika Birch
T.

V.

CONCLUSION

Based 0n the above, Knudsen respectfully requests

DATED this

entitled t0 fees

Guy Hallam

STRINDBERG & SCHOLNICK, LLC
Attorneys for Appellant/Plaintiff
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ADDENDUM
Harvey V. MaXJ'mus,

1110.,

2014

Harvey v. Maxz‘mus, Ina, 2016

WL 6474051

(D.

Idaho Nov.

19,

2014)

WL 7256797 (D.

Idaho Dec.

15,

2016)

Harvey

2014

Maximus

v.

lnc.,

Not Reported

in

F.Supp.3d (2014)

WL 6474051
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.

2014
Only the Westlaw

Id.

WL 6474051

Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent

with” a defendant's

“stops short ofthe line between
“
Id. at
possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’

citation is currently available.

United States District Court, D. Idaho.

liability,

it

557.

Regis

HARVEY, Amanda Collins, Andrea

McDonald, Individually and

The Supreme Court identiﬁed two “working

On Behalf

that underlie

0f All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff,

678 (2009).

Twombly

in Ashcroft

need not accept

First, the court

principles”

556 U.S. 662,

Iqbal,

v.

as true, legal

v.

conclusions that are couched as factual allegations.

MAXIMUS INC., Defendant.

Rule

Id.

8 does not “unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff

armed with nothing more than conclusions.”

No. 1:14—cv—00161—BLW.

Id. at

678—79.

Second, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must

state

|

Signed Nov.

19,

a plausible claim for

2014.

relief. Id. at

679. “Determining whether

a complaint states a plausible claim for relief Will

be a

context—speciﬁc task that requires the reviewing court to draw

on

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
LYNN WINMILL,

B.

its

judicial experience

Under Rule

Chief Judge.

and

common

12(b)(6), the Court

may

sense.” Id.

consider documents

referred to in the complaint, although not attached thereto,

without transforming the motion to dismiss into a motion for

INTRODUCTION
*1

Before the Court

Dismiss
oral

is

Defendant Maximus' Motion

Amended Complaint

argument Will not

the pleadings

and deny

summary judgment. See Knievel

(Dkt.5).

The Court ﬁnds

assist the decisional process.

and record before

it,

that

ANALYSIS

fully expressed below.

After acquiring a

new

contract to serve as a call center for

health insurance exchanges,
to

LEGAL STANDARD
1.

it

that the pleader

entitled to relief,” in order to “give the defendant fair

claim

is

and the grounds upon which

rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp.

v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555,

notice of

what the

127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007). While a complaint attacked by
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “does not need detailed
factual allegations,”

it

must

set forth

“more than

labels

and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action will not do.” Id
to dismiss,

.

at

555.

To survive a motion

a complaint must contain sufﬁcient factual matter,

accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that
its

face.” Id. at 570.

is

plausible

demand.

new employees

Maximus employs both

“regular

on

while regular capacity employees work at-will without
a

contractually

deﬁned period of

time.

Plaintiffs

were

hired as regular capacity employees and believed that they

were accepting a career opportunity with Maximus. They

were

let

go as part of a reduction in force, which they

claim was planned before they were hired. Plaintiffs argue
fraudulent misrepresentation because

Maximus marketed and

offered open ended career opportunities

they were

When

it

knew

that

limited in time. Plaintiffs also argue negligent

misrepresentation and promissory estoppel. Maximus' motion
seeks to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim and

plead fraud with particularity.

Def ’s Br.

at 3

Dkt 571.

A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw
I.

the reasonable inference that the defendant

misconduct alleged.

its

hired

employees work full-time for a deﬁned period of time,

Legal Standardfor Rule 12(b) (6) Motions

and plain statement of the claim showing

meet

Maximus

capacity” and “limited service” employees. Limited service

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short

is

ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068,

Based on

the Court will grant in part

more

in part the Motion, as

to

v.

1076 (9th Cir.2005).

Id. at 556.

The

for the

plausibility standard

not akin to a “probability requirement,” but

WESTLAW © 2020 Thomson

is liable

Reuters.

it

asks for

No

is

Fraudulent Misrepresentation

*2 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), a plaintiff

must plead each of the elements of a fraud claim with

more

claim to original U.S.
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particularityimeaning that a plaintiff “must

set forth

more

employment

refers to their

and

as a “career opportunity”

A

than the neutral facts necessary to identify the transaction.”

explains compensation “in succeeding years.” Ex.

Cooper

3—1. Plaintiffs use Maximus'

at 10)

to argue that

hiring

v.

Pickett,

137 F.3d 616, 625 (9th Cir.1997). In other

words, fraud claims must be accompanied by the “Who,

how” of

what, when, Where, and
charged. Vess

v.

Ciba—Geigy Corp, USA, 317 F.3d 1097,

A

1106 (9th Cir.2003).
9(b)

if

the fraudulent conduct

pleading

so that a defendant can prepare an adequate answer from

Moore

the allegations.

v.

Dkt.

“limited service” employees, even though they were being

presented as “regular capacity” employees.

sufﬁcient under Rule

is

identiﬁes the circumstances constituting fraud

it

at 2,

own documentation (Id.
Maximus knew that it was effectually

Kayport Package Express, Ina,

The “who, what, when, where, and how”

*3

by Plaintiffs pleading of the circumstances
which

are sufﬁcient for

Maximus

are satisﬁed

constituting fraud,

to prepare

an adequate

885 F.2d 531, 540 (9th Cir.1989). While statements of the

answer to the complaint. Maximus

time, place, and nature of the alleged fraudulent activities

any speciﬁc information regarding exact dates and names

are

mere conclusory

sufﬁcient,

insufﬁcient. Id.

allegations

of fraud are

they feel

it is

the best source to obtain

is

if

necessary to respond to the complaint.

A party may allege on information and belief

under circumstances in Which the required facts are peculiarly
B. Elements of Fraud

within the defendant's knowledge or control, but, should they

do

so, the party

Neubronner

v.

must

still

state the factual basis for the belief.

Milken, 6 F.3d 666, 672 (9th Cir.1993).

To prove

fraud,

elements:

“(1)

a plaintiff must establish the following

a representation;

materiality; (4) the speaker's

Maximus

contends

that

complaint

Plaintiffs

contains

ignorance ofits truth; (5) his intent that
the person and in the

its

(2)

falsity;

knowledge about
it

(3)

its falsity

its

or

should be acted upon

manner reasonably contemplated;

fundamental defects which prevent Maximus from preparing

by

an adequate response. These fundamental defects include lack

(6) the hearer‘s

of particularity in general, and failure

the [representation]; (8) his rights to rely thereon; (9) his

to

plead

all

elements of

fraud With particularity.

that Plaintiffs

(7) his reliance

on

v.

Corp, 108 P.3d 380, 386 (Idaho 2005)

(internal citation

Maximus

Boise Cascade

objects to Plaintiffs' complaint

element of fraud. Each

A. Pled with Particularity

its falsity;

consequent and proximate injury.” Jenkins

omitted).

Maximus contends

ignorance of

is

on every

addressed below.

have not sufﬁciently pled

“the time, place and content of the fraudulent representation”

F.3d at 1042. Plaintiffs have not listed exact dates, places,
or

names of

individual representative of

were involved with

this alleged fraud.

Maximus which

But

Plaintiffs

have

given the circumstances surrounding fraud. Rule 9(b) does
not require “absolute particularity

especially

when some

matters are beyond the knowledge of the pleader and can

only be developed through discovery
Federal Practice

& Procedure,

§

.”

1298

5A Wright and Miller,

at p.

192 (3d ed.2004).

If the circumstances surrounding fraud are given with

particularity for the defense to prepare

Rule 9(b)

is

satisﬁed.

enough

an adequate answer,

Odom v. Microsoft Corp, 486 F.3d 541,

Representation

1.

and simply rely on “conclusory allegations.” Shroyer, 622

Plaintiffs allege representations

Maximus.

message—from

interview to offer letter—that

offering career type

Maximus was

work without a predetermined

See Am. Comp. Dkt.

for termination.

changed or expanded

their pleading

timeline

3. Plaintiffs

have not

by explaining

that they

were promised the opportunity of career employment.
Res.

At 5—7 Dkt.

argument that

10. Plaintiffs' clariﬁcation refutes

at-Will

employment language

letter contradicts Plaintiffs'

Br.

At

4, Dkt.

Pl.'s

Maximus'

in the

offer

claim of early termination. Def. ’s

5—1. Plaintiffs are not arguing a breach of

contract for early termination.

555 (9th Cir.2007).

of career-type work from

have pled a consistent and plausible

Plaintiffs

They are arguing that they were

misled from the beginning about the type of employment

Simply alleging

that

capacity” employees

Maximus

told Plaintiffs that “regular

would remain employed aﬁer

open enrollment period would not be enough
Rule

9(b).

However,

circumstance

when

initial interview.

also

Plaintiffs

provide

these assurances were ﬁrst

Am. Comp.

corroborate their complaint

43, Dkt.

to

a

the ﬁrst
satisfy

speciﬁc

made—the

3.

Plaintiffs also

by supplying an

offer letter that

1]

WESTLAW © 2020 Thomson

Reuters.

No

they were entering
there

is

into.

No

at-will

job

is

guaranteed, but

a signiﬁcant difference between career type at-

will positions,

and seasonal or temporary

Plaintiffs correctly rely

employment does not

upon Meade

shield an

to

at-will positions.

show

that at-will

employer from claims arising

from misrepresentations about the nature of the employment.
Pl.’s Res.

claim to original U.S.

At

10, Dkt. 10.

Government Works.
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Plaintiffs

have pled with particularity that they were ignorant

ofthe deﬁnite duration of their employment.
Falsity

2.

that Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs argue that they

past

exist

at-will nature

show

not enough to simply

is

longer working
that

illustrates

at

would

career-type

of the employment,
are

that Plaintiffs

Maximus. However,

Maximus

that

and were

enrolment,

initial

Because of the

positions.
it

the

were offered positions

no

complaint

Plaintiffs'

did not just lay off workers,

it

executed a reduction in force which reduced positions. Am.

Comp.

55, Dkt. 3.

11

position

is

Plaintiffs

Maximus's planned elimination of the

a sufﬁcient allegation that the representation that

were being offered “regular capacity” positions was

false.

work

at

for

that

Maximus.

they gave up long-term employment
Id.

They claim

13—15.

1]

that the

to leave current

employment, and accept an employment offer from Maximus.
Because

86.

1]

any time. However,

Plaintiffs‘ allegations.

this

misconstrues the nature of the

Again,

capacity” employment that

the promise of “regular-

is

it

alleged to be false, not the

is

terms of the contract. Nothing in the offer
Plaintiffs they

letter

would

alert

were being offered anything other than a career

A

opportunity. Ex.

at

24,

On

Dkt. 371

the contrary, the

offer letter appears to perpetuate the notion that Plaintiffs

were entering career-type employment with the potential

for

yearly pay increases. Id. Plaintiffs have successfully pled their

7. Plaintiffs’

have pled

promise of a career opportunity led them

Id.

of their

ignorance of falsity.

Plaintiffs
to

Maximus argues

at-will condition

employment, and thus were aware they could be terminated

Materiality

3.

were aware of the

position

Plaintiffs

would not have changed

their

by giving up long-term employment had they known

they were only being offered temporary employment, the
representations were material.

Reliance

acceptance of employment

Plaintiffs‘

secure jobs in order to

13715, Dkt.

Again,

3.

work

evidence that they

And

the case

also quit

Maximus. Am. Comp.

for

Maximus

1]

attempts to frame this as

a breach of contract claim, barred
the employment.
v.

is

on the representations of Maximus. They

relied

by

the at—will nature of

upon which they

rely,

Snoey

Advanced Forming Technoloty, Ina, 844 F.Supp. 1394

(1994),

is

concerns wrongful termination and an estoppel

claim regarding the length of employment. The passage relied

upon by Maximus speaks mainly t0 an estoppel claim related

Masimus‘ Knowledge of Falsity

4.

*4 The Ninth Circuit has concluded “that plaintiffs

may aver

to the

terms of the contract, and has

little if

reliance in the context of a fraud claim.
scienter generally, just as [Rule 9(b)

]

states—that

is,

when

As has been discussed

not arguing a breach of contract for early

Inc. Sec.

terminationithey are arguing that they were misled from the
Plaintiffs

Litig.,

satisfy this requirement

to

simply
earlier, Plaintiffs are

by saying that scienter existed.” 1n re GlenFed,
42 F.3d 1541, 1547 (9th Cir.1994) (en banc).

any application

they allege “Defendants

knew

beginning about the type of employment they were entering
into.

that

its

representations were false

3. Plaintiffs

at 10, Dkt.

go even

further

by

...”

Am. Comp.

1]

68, Dkt.

offering documentation (Ex.

371) that supports their claim that Maximus

that its representations

were

A

knew

false.

8.

Right to Rely

Because of the clear

Intent that a False Representation be Acted

Again, the Ninth Circuit concluded “that plaintiffs

Upon
may aver

language in the offer

letter,

have no right to rely on a contract for an

Plaintiffs

5.

at-will

extended period of time. But

Plaintiffs'

complaint does

not argue breach of contract for early termination.

As

explained above, Plaintiffs argue that they were relying on
scienter generally, just as [Rule 9(b)

]

states—that

is,

simply
the representation

by saying that scienter existed.” 1n re GlenFed,
Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1547 (9th Cir.1994) (en banc).
meet

this

requirement

when

intended for Plaintiffs to act on

career type employment.
is

they pled that “Defendant
untrue representation” Am.

position,

raises. Ex.

A

is

WESTLAW © 2020 Thomson

Reuters.

offer

No

guaranteed, but

is

at 2,

letter. Id.

claim to original U.S.

at-will position. This

reinforced by the offer letter outlining yearly

Dkt. 3—1. Plaintiffs right to rely

laid out in the circumstances

Ignorance of Falsity

job

at-will

and a seasonal or temporary

69, Dkt. 3.

6. Plaintiffs‘

were accepting

a signiﬁcant difference between a career-type at-will

representation

Comp. ﬂ

No

that they

Plaintiffs

there
its

from Maximus

Inc. Sec.

They

is

clearly

of interviews and subsequent

correctly pled that they “had a right to

Government Works.
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upon the representations made by Maximus.” Am. Comp.

rely

71,

11

Maximus

v.

Dkt

substitute

for

an agreement between parties.” Chapin

v.

Linden, 162 P.3d 772, 776 (Idaho 2007). But, promissory
3.

estoppel is proper when one party has characterized an offer as

one thing, but actually offers something
9.

*5

have

sufﬁciently

“Plaintiffs left Viable

employment

Plaintiffs

Maximus, and/or
at

pled proximate

injury:

for a career opportunity at

employment opportunity

Plaintiffs selected

Maximus over other available career opportunities. Further,
are

Plaintiffs

were subject

different.

Promissory

would represent

estoppel, as a substitute for consideration,

Proximate Injury

whatever consideration was represented in the agreement.

Maximus

Here, Plaintiffs pled that

said

was

it

offering

“regular capacity” or career type employment, but actually

offered temporary employment.

Am. Comp.

1T

16, Dkt. 3.

no longer employed by Maximus as they
to

RIF.” Am.

the

Comp.

ﬂ 72,

Dkt.

3.

Plaintiffs

have presented a plausible argument that they

arguments as tme, their reliance on

reasonably relied on Maximus' representation that they would

Maximus' representations resulted in their leaving or forgoing

be “regular capacity” employees with an indeﬁnite period

Accepting

Plaintiffs

now

secure employment, for temporary and

nonexisting

of employment.

A

employment.

1d. Plaintiffs

the time

employment was offered

period of time, even
II.

Negligent Misrepresentation

Both

parties

agree

Plaintiffs

claim

the

that

negligent

for

misrepresentation should be dismissed.

duration

was

it

at

for a limited

was not exactly deﬁned.

from Maximus and from leaving or forgoing

other secure employment.

motion

Am. Comp.

argument

is

11

13715, Dkt.

3.

Thus,

sufﬁciently pled to survive a

to dismiss.

Promissory Estopel

The elements ofpromissory estoppel
suffered in reliance

was

(2) substantial loss to the

are:

“

‘(1) the

promisee acting

detriment

economic sense;

substantial in an

in reliance

was

ORDER

or

should have been foreseeable by the promisor; and (3) the

promisee must have acted reasonably

on

if the

that

Maximus knew

have also shown substantial harm, evidenced by

their termination

Plaintiffs' estoppel

III.

have offered documents (Ex.

at 10, Dkt. 3—1.) which suggest that

the promise as

made

.’

“

Mitchell

in justiﬁable reliance
v.

Inc.

V.

Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 804

P.2d 900, 907 n. 2 (1991)) (quoting

Mohr v.

Shultz,

388 P.2d

cannot use promissory estoppel simply to alter the

agreement they made with Maximus.
estoppel

End

of

is

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt.5)

IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

It is

is

GRANTED

granted as to the

negligent misrepresentation claim and denied as to

all

other

All Citations

A claim of “promissory

simply a substitute for consideration, not a

Not Reported

© 2020 Thomson

Document

WESTLAW © 2020 Thomson

1.

claims.

1002, 1008 (1964))).

Plaintiffs

ORDERED:

Bingham Memorial

Hosp, 130 Idaho 420, 942 P.2d 544 (1997) (quoting Black
Canyon Racquetball Club,

IT IS

Reuters.

No

claim to original U.S.

in F.Supp.3d,

Reuters.

No
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claim to original U.S.

Government Works.
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MAXIMUS
2016

Only the Westlaw

its

WL 7256797

citation is currently available.

at 2).

Customer Service

(“CSRS”) answered incoming

Trainers were responsible for training incoming
for

knowing company

1d.

calls.

CSRS and

materials. Id. First-Level Supervisors

were responsible for a team of approximately 14 CSFs and

HARVEY, Amanda Collins, Andrea

McDonald, Individually and

(Dkt 28-1

center.

call

Representatives

United States District Court, D. Idaho.
Regis

Boise

hired three categories of employees to staff

monitored the CSRs' work product and productivity.

On Behalf

Most

0f All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff,

Trainers were hired

at 5).

Maximus

hired

Supervisors were hired by late July 2013. Id.

v.

about 1,800

MAXIMUS INC., Defendant.
Case No. 1:14—cv-00161-BLW

CSRs

in

Id.

by mid-June 2013. (Dkt. 36

waves, with the ﬁrst wave beginning

training in

mid-September 2013 and the second wave on

October

2013.

1,

Id.

MAXIMUS

throughout the Fall of 2013.

continued to hire

CSRs

1d.

|

Signed 12/15/2016

MAXIMUS

Harvey was employed by
Attorneys and

Law Firms

hired in July 2013.

Am. Comp].

been employed by Verizon
Allison

M. Blackman, Zions Bank, Howard A.

Belodoff,

Idaho Legal Aid Services, Inc, Jeremiah Matthew Hudson,
Nicholas A. Warden, Vaughn Fisher, Fisher Rainey Hudson,
Boise, ID, for Plaintiff.

Bennett, Jennifer

M.

Jensen, Ted C. Murdock, Holland

and Hart LLP, Boise, ID, Douglas
Masciocchi, Holland

MAXIMUS

L. Abbott,

Stephen G.

& Hart, Denver, CO, for Defendant.

job

at

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

MAXIMUS.

a Supervisor and

working

INTRODUCTION
is plaintiffs

Maximus

for
1]

as

15. Prior to

Id.

hiring employees,

Maximus

employee an

sent every

The

contained language stating that the offer was

letters

36

Plaintiffs received. (Dkt.

that

Maximus

an excellent career opportunity for

at 9).

believed

you and

that

we

can offer you challenges to grow professionally.”

The

offer letters contained

Offer

1d.

an “Employment At-Will” clause.

letters to limited-service

employees

stated,

“We

Regis Harvey's,

and Andrea McDonald's (collectively the

Motion

an opportunity for professional growth.”

to Certify Class. (Dkt. 28).

seek to certify a class to challenge

Inc.'s hiring

and ﬁring of employees

Boise, Idaho.

MAXIMUS

MAXIMUS

Trainers

in succeeding years will

letters to regular-capacity

Offer letters

CSRS

stated,

“Your succeeding

compensation reviews and adjustments will be contingent
calls regarding the

on

the federally established annual

rate for

Information Technology (“GDIT”),

who

in turn contracted

operate these call centers. Id.

your position and

Wage Determination

locality.” 1d.

including Collins, signed an “Employee

Form” which contained language

The
recognizes that employment

subcontract became effective on April 15, 2013. Id. Hiring for
the call center in Boise

Id.

“Your compensation

be considered for adjustment as

at their call center in

Medicaid Services contracted With General Dynamics

t0

stated,

part of our normal performance review process.” Id. Offer

Affordable Care Act. (Dkt. 36 at 2). The Centers for Medicare

MAXIMUS

and Supervisors

operated call centers in Boise,

Idaho and Brownsville, Texas to ﬁeld

with

McDonald worked

hired in July 2013. Id.

an

for the

which the

to

&

1d.

was

Institute as

employment

believe this Will be an excellent career choice offering
Collins's,

“P1aintiffs”)

Plaintiffs

ITT Technical

offer letter,

Id.

Pending before the Court

job

left his

Maximus, McDonald had a custom clothing and

show company.

“this is

Amanda

at

one of “full-time employment” and

Lynn Winmill, Chief Judge

*1

at

and

MAXIMUS. Id. Collins was employed by
CSR and was hired in July 2013. Id. ﬂ 14.

She had previously worked

When

B.

at

as a

and was

Harvey had previously

13.

for six years

Instructor for four years and left that

Newal Squyres, Pamela Simmons Howland, A. Dean

B.

work

there to

1]

as a Trainer

was

speciﬁc length of employment.”

Some employees,
Acknowledgment

stating that the
at—will

employee

and there was “no

Id. at 9-10.

began in summer 2013 with additional

hiring extending into fall of 2013. Id. at 3.

WESTLAW © 2020 Thomson
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In addition to these written statements, Plaintiffs also

were made

allege that oral promises

Am. Comp].

to them.

ﬂ 43. Plaintiffs allege that

MAXIMUS

regular capacity employees

“would remain employed aﬂer

the ﬁrst

open enrollment period

to service future enrollment

CCO

periods through the duration of the

MAXIMUS allegedly
“after the CCO contract

told Plaintiffs that

contract.” Id.

Further,

told Plaintiffs during hiring

that

they would

MAXIMUS.” Id.

projects for

GDIT

In August 2013,

11

work on

other

44.

determined that the projected

call

volume indicated a “ramp down” beginning in Spring of2014
for the

MAXIMUS

MAXIMUS,

it

Boise

employees would be

in

call center. 1d. at 5.

became apparent

According

However,

MAXIMUS hired an addition 600 CSRs after January 1, 2014
in

temporary positions for a limited duration because of the

impending reduction

members

all

On

April 25, 2015,

MAXIMUS

16 Trainers.
these

terminated 850 employees.

terminated 777 CSRs, 57 Supervisors, and

Id.

Of

850 employees terminated, 199 of

the

were limited capacity CSRs.

capacity employees were

The 651

Id.

regular-

two weeks' severance

offered

that joinder of

to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of

the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses

of the

class;

and

(4) the representative parties will fairly

and

adequately protect the interests of the class.

These four requirements of 23(a) are designed
that the

named

the class

whose claims they wish

to “[ensure]

plaintiffs are appropriate representatives

to litigate.” Id. at 349.

of

This

Court must, following a “rigorous analysis,” be satisﬁed that
Plaintiffs will fulﬁll that role. Id. at 351.

Second, Plaintiffs must show that the proposed class satisﬁes
at least

one of the Rule 23(b) requirements.

on Rule
or fact

23(b)(3),

common

Plaintiffs rely

Which applies when questions of law

members predominate over any

to class

questions affecting only individual members, and that a class

in force. Id. at 6.

MAXIMUS

numerous

impracticable; (2) there are questions of law

is

common

or fact

action

1d.

that: (1) the class is so

to

that a signiﬁcant reduction

necessary in Boise. Id.

must show

is

superior to other available methods for fairly and

efﬁciently adjudicating the controversy. Fed. R. Civ.
(3).

Rule 23 (b)(3) also provides that matters pertinent

ﬁndings include:

(1) the interest

P.

23(b)

to these

of the class members in

individually controlling the prosecution of separate actions;

and nature of any

(2) the extent

litigation

concerning the

exchange for a signed Separation Agreement and

controversy already begun by or against class members; (3)

Release. Id. Out of the employees offered the severance

the desirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims

pay

in

pay, 526 employees signed a Separation Agreement. Id.

in the particular forum;

The Separation Agreement included a clause

managing a

releasing

and

(4) the likely difﬁculties in

class action. Id.

MAXIMUS of all claims, including those arising from a class
*3

action lawsuit. Id.

Plaintiffs bring claims for fraudulent misrepresentation

promissory estoppel.
allege that

Am. Comp].

MAXIMUS's

and the proposed

class

12-15 (Dkt.

and

3). Plaintiffs

hiring process promised Plaintiffs

members

MAXIMUS

challenges

commonality,

typicality,

requirements

of Rule

contends

that

the

Plaintiffs'

motion

on

the

and adequacy of representation
23(a).

Furthermore,

predominance

test

and

MAXIMUS
superiority

requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) are not met.

employment when

career

MAXIMUS had no intention of retaining the new employees
for long-teml

employment. (Dkt. 28-1

to certify a class

of

Maximus beginning
January

1,

all

at 3-4). Plaintiffs

seek

“similarly situated persons hired

in approximately June

2014, and were employed

at its

2013 up

Boise

ANALYSIS

by

until

call center

as [CSRs], Trainers, and First—Level Supervisors.” Id. at 4.

Plaintiffs fail to

meet the typicality requirements ofRule 23(a)

and the predominance standard of Rule 23(b)(3). Because
these elements are not met, the Court declines to certify the

proposed

class.

LEGAL STANDARD
a. Typicalily

Under Rule 23 of
plaintiffs

must

certiﬁcation

is

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

“afﬁrmatively

appropriate.

demonstrate”

Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc.

564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). Under Rule

WESTLAW © 2020 Thomson

that
v.

class

Dukes,

23(a), the Plaintiffs

Reuters.

No

The

typicality prerequisite

of Rule (23)(a)

is

fulﬁlled if “the

claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical

of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed.R.CiV.P. 23(a)
(3).

The commonality and

claim to original U.S.

typicality requirements

Government Works.

of Rule

2

Harvey

v.

MAXIMUS

Inc.,

Not Reported

Fed. Supp. (2016)

in

WL 7256797

2016

23(a) “tend to merge” because both “serve as guideposts
for determining

689 (1997). This analysis presumes the existence of common

of the class

issues of fact or law; thus, the presence of commonality alone

will be fairly

and adequately protected in

absence.” Wal—Mart, 564 U.S.

at

their

is

not sufﬁcient t0 fulﬁll Rule 23(b)(3). Hanlon

cannot meet the typicality elements of Rule

Plaintiffs

Chrysler

v.

Corp, 150 F.3d 10 1 1, 1022 (9th Cir. 1998). In contrast to Rule

349, n.5.

on

23(a)(2), Rule 23(b)(3) focuses

The

138 L.Ed.2d

1,

whether the named plaintiffs claim and

class claims are so interrelated that the interests

members

Wzndsor, 521 U.S. 591, 608, 117 S.Ct. 223

common and

the

between

the relationship

individual issues. Id.

23(a) because none of them sigled the Separation Agreement

upon termination

releasing their claims against

Out of the 651

regular-capacity

MAXIMUS.

employees terminated

during the reduction in force, 526 signed the Separation

Agreement
from

all

that contained a clause releasing

potential claims, including those arising

*4

have claims of fraud and promissory estoppel

Plaintiffs

remaining in
Plaintiffs

To prove fraud under Idaho

this action.

must prove the following nine elements:

MAXIMUS
from a

class

action lawsuit, and received compensation for signing the

(1)

agreement. Plaintiffs are clearly atypical of the vast majority

A

representation; (2)

of the proposed class in that they did not sign the Separation

knowledge
ignorance of

about

be

should

that

it

In their Motion for Class Certiﬁcation (Dkt. 28) and reply

the

person

brief (Dkt. 37), Plaintiffs failed to mention or offer any

reasonably

explanation of how Plaintiffs are typical of the class

hearer's ignorance

members

they did not sign the Separation Agreement that over

80 percent of the proposed

MAXIMUS

class signed. Plaintiffs attempted

in

MAXIMUS'S

offer a response

37

at

how

However, merely alleging

15-16).

that

the

of the class when they did

Plaintiffs are typical

not sign the Separation Agreements. Plaintiffs are atypical

of the proposed class speciﬁcally because they did not
sign the Separation Agreements and, as such, cannot claim
to represent the class
Plaintiffs fail to

of

its

the

(6)

falsity;

(7)

the [representation];

consequent and proximate

injury.

other than the fact that the Separation

Separation Agreements are a part of the claim does not
explain

on

manner

response brief, but could not

Agreements were a part of the alleged fraudulent scheme.
(Dkt.

the

in

(8) his right to rely thereon; (9) his

themselves from the case law presented by

to distinguish

upon by

contemplated;

his reliance

or

(5) his intent

acted

and

falsity;

speaker's

falsity

its

truth;

its

its

(4) the

(3) its materiality;

Agreement.

when

law,

members who

meet the

For

did.

typicality element

this reason,

MWI Veterinalj/ Supply C0.
*2 (D. Idaho July
Plaintiffs

3,

must prove

Wotton, 2012

v.

WL 2576205, at

2012). To prove promissory
that “(1)

one

estoppel,

party's reliance

on a

promise [created] a substantial economic detriment, (2) the
reliance

was

reliance

was reasonable and

or should have been foreseeable, and (3) the
justiﬁed.” Proﬁts Plus Capital

Mgmt. LLCv. Podesta, 156 Idaho 873, 891, 332 P.3d 785, 803
(2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

of Rule 23(a).

Both the fraud and promissory estoppel claims contain
b.

an

Predominance

In addition to meeting the conditions imposed
23(a), the patties seeking class certiﬁcation
that the action is maintainable

23(b)(3) requires that

common

by Rule
must also show

under Rule 23(b)(3). Rule

questions must “predominate

over any questions affecting only individual members,”

and

that the class resolution

available

methods

for fairly

must be “superior

to other

and efﬁciently adjudicating the

that

“The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry

adjudication

by

are

sufficiently

representation.”

tests

cohesive

Amchem

WESTLAW © 2020 Thomson

MAXIMUS

reliance.

“individualized reliance

issues

related

to

argues

plaintiffs'

knowledge, motivations, and expectations bear heavily on
the causation analysis,” Poulos

v.

Caesar’s World, Ina, 379

F.3d 654, 665 (9th Cir. 2004), and that the claims Plaintiffs
bring for fraud and promissory estoppel clearly require
a showing of individualized reliance to prove causation
that cannot

the

classes

of individual

be presumed on a class-wide

basis. Plaintiffs

respond that individual reliance does not predominate over

controversy.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3).

proposed

element

to

Whether
warrant

Products, Inc.

Reuters.

No

common question and that they have

wide inference of reliance

because the logical motivation

for accepting a ‘career opportunity’

are seeking an

“established a class-

is

limited to those

opportunity for a career.” Dkt.

37

who

at 9.

v.

claim to original U.S.

Government Works.
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Harvey

MAXIMUS

v.

Not Reported

lnc.,

Fed. Supp. (2016)

in

WL 7256797

2016

and

for different reasons,
Plaintiffs are incorrect,

predominance

however, because the issue here of

not whether class

is

members were accepting

a job with career opportunities. Rather,

members

relied

it is

whether the class

on an alleged promise, whether

this reliance

can be presumed on a class-Wide basis, and whether the

common question predominates
reliance. It is not

enough

to

accepting employment with

unclear whether they relied

on an alleged promise of “career employment”

in accepting

‘common

the employment. Here, Plaintiffs' “suggestion that
sense’ links” accepting

employment to a reliance on a promise

of career employment

not sufﬁcient to grant presumed

is

reliance. Id. at 667.

over any issues of individual

merely allege

members expected

that the class

it is

career

that

obvious

it is

employment when

MAXIMUS.

Plaintiffs'

fraud and promissory estoppel claims clearly

require a showing of individual reliance, and there are

many unanswered

too

questions in this case to establish a

presumption of reliance. For example, did each individual

The Supreme Court recognized a
presumed and individual reliance
P.

John Fund, Ina, 134

between

distinction

in Halliburton C0.

v.

Erica

2398 (2014). There, the Court

S.Ct.

held in a securities fraud case that a defendant has a right

presumption of reliance during class certiﬁcation.

to rebut a
Id.

at

2414-17. The Court held that

be presumed, a

Each
so

plaintiff

common

suit

if reliance

could not

“cannot proceed as a class action:

would have

prove reliance individually,

to

issues would not ‘predominate’ over individual

ones, as required

by Rule

23(b)(3).” Id. at 2416.

member

class

rely

on the

offer letters' language of a career

opportunity when accepting employment? And, ifnot, did the

members rely on an oral promise of career employment?

class
If so,

What exactly was said

each class

member that could have been a promise, and were

these oral promised said in exactly the

MAXIMUS

Poulos, 379 F.3d 654. There,

this issues is

on

the Ninth Circuit

noted the “shortcut of a presumption of reliance typically

in every

interview? Clearly there are fundamental issues of reliance

depositions, the
relied

argued, the leading Ninth Circuit case

same way

here that Plaintiffs have not provided answers

named

to.

Further, in

Plaintiffs did not establish that they

on written or oral representations of career employment

in accepting the positions at

As

in each individual interview to

MAXIMUS.

The Court cannot

presume reliance on a class-wide basis when there

are clear

discrepancies and unanswered questions regarding individual
reliance for each plaintiff.

has been applied in cases involving securities fraud and,

even then, the presumption applies only in cases primarily
”

involving a ‘failure to disclose....’

Id. at

666. The Ninth

Discovery
that

is

over in

presumed

this case,

reliance

is

and

Plaintiffs

have not shown

proper here. Because individual

Circuit declined to apply this presumption of reliance in

issues of reliance clearly predominate over any

Poulos because the claims were “best characterized as

issues, the

afﬁrmative misrepresentations

would not be

that

predominance element of Rule 23(b)(3)

common

is

not met.

entitled to

the presumption.” 1d.

*5 As a starting point,

CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs'

case

is

not a securities

fraud case and instead revolves around the issue of what

Because

promises or representations were made to Plaintiffs when they

requirement of Rule 23(a) and the predominance standard

were offered employment with
to

Poulos

in that Plaintiffs'

MAXIMUS.

claims allege

This

is

similar

MAXIMUS

made

afﬁrmative misrepresentations rather than failed to disclose a
fact.

Plaintiffs

have

failed

to

meet the

typicality

of Rule 23(b)(3), the Court need not discuss the remaining
elements of Rule 23(a) or Rule 23(b)(3) and declines to do

As

such, the Plaintiffs'

Motion

so.

to Certify class is denied.

Therefore, Plaintiffs are most certainly not entitled to a

presumption of reliance.

Plaintiffs

have not shown

wide basis

that

presumed reliance on a

ORDER

class-

is

proper here because whether the claims succeed

clearly turns

on individual reliance of an alleged promise

IT IS

ORDERED:

of career employment. Each individual class members'
experiences and decisions in accepting employment could

vary greatly.

It

has been

presented that the

named

shown through
Plaintiffs
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the

evidence

accepted employment

Reuters.
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2016

v.

MAXIMUS

lnc.,

Not Reported

in

Fed. Supp. (2016)

WL 7256797

1.

Plaintiffs

Motion

Certiﬁcation (Dkt. 28)

for
is

Class

All Citations

DENIED.
Not Reported

End
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